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Abstract: This paper deals with Abū Bakr Ibn al-‘Arabī’s Ash‘arite theological 
perspective. He chose to adopt Ash‘arism because he believes that God chose certain 
figures to safeguard religion and the most important one among them is Abu al-
Hasan al-Ash‘arī from whom correct theology spread from one generation of disciples 
to another. His education at Nidhamiyya College and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali’s 
tutorship might also be responsible for his preference for Ash‘arism. However, even 
though he was al-Ghazali’s student, he was not attracted by Sufism, instead keeping 
his focus on theology. He objected to Sufism for two defects he perceived it to possess. 
First is Sufis’ references to fake Hadiths and second the Sufi practice of self-
mortification. As a devoted Ash‘arite, he consistently opposes the anthropomorphic 
interpretation of God’s nature espoused by the Hanbalites and the Dhahirite. 
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Abstrak: Tulisan ini membahas perspektip Ashariyah yang dianut oleh Abu Bakar 
Ibn Arabi. Pilihannya kepada Madhab Kalam Ashariya adalah karena dia 
berkeyakinan bahwa Tuhan memilih orang orang tertentu untuk  memelihara 
agama Islam. Menurutnya, tokoh yang paling penting yang dipilih adalah Abu 
Hasan al’As’ari yang daripadanyalah teologi yang benar disebarkan dari satu 
generasi kegenerasi berikutnya . Latar belakang pendidikannya dari universitas 
Nidhamiyya dan dibawah bimbingan Abu Hamid al-Ghazali mungkin menjadi 
penyebab kecendrungannya pada aliran kalām Asariyah. Kendatipun dia belajar 
dengan al-Ghazali, dia tidak tertarik pada tasawwuf. Menurutnya, tasawwuf 
punya dua kelemahan. Pertama karena penngunaan hadis hadis palsu dan kedua 
karena penyiksaan diri yang diparaktekan kaum sufi. Sebagai penganut Ashariyah 
yang taat, Abu Bakar Ibn Arabi sangat menentang pemahaman antropormik 
tentang Tuhan yang dianut kaum Hanbaliyyah dan Zahiriyyah.  
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Introduction 
Despite the major significance of Abū Bakr Ibn al-‘Arabī’s (468/1076-
543/1148) role as the champion of Ash‘arism in Spain, until now there has 
been very little attention given to exploring his contribution to Islamic 
theological discourse, especially with regards to Ash‘arism. Indeed, there does 
not appear to be a single study in English focusing on the theological thought of 
this scholar. This paper intends to address this disparity in the literature. My 
research is mostly based on al-‘Arabī’s work al-‘Awāṣim min al-Qawāṣim. This 
book is not only rich in theological discussions but also contains many 
autobiographical details from which we learn about his dynamic intellectual life. 
To limit our scope, however, I focus here on his polemic against theologians 
who embrace a literalist understanding of religious texts.  
 
Studying Critically with al-Ghazālī 
Al-‘Arabī tells that Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (450/1058-505/1111) was 
among his important teachers. His great admiration for al-Ghazālī is reflected in 
his description of him as a full moon that lights up the heavens and states in 
relation to him that he really met one of the greatest men of the age.1 While it is 
not clear whether or not he spent a long period of time with al-Ghazālī, it 
appears that he met him during his sojourn at al-Madrasa al-Nidhāmīya 
(Nidhamiyya College) in Baghdad as well as in Tus where he may have studied 
some of al-Ghazālī’s works with al-Ghazālī himself.2  
Nidhamiyya College was established in 1065. In 484/1091, Niẓām al-
Mulk appointed the 33-year old al-Ghazālī as a professor in the school. In 
488/1095, he withdrew from that position and retreated from worldly affairs.3 
Al-‘Arabī met him in 490/1097 at Nidhamiyya College, just two years after his 
self-imposed seclusion.4 However, it is impossible that he only studied with al-
Ghazālī for several months because after finishing his mystical travels and 
seclusion in 489/1096, al-Ghazālī only stayed several months in Baghdad. He 
then came back to his birthplace Tus where he would stay for almost ten years. 
It is thus quite possible that al-‘Arabī studied with al-Ghazālī during his time in 
Tus. However, it is quite unlikely that he followed al-Ghazālī to Nishapur 
because al-Ghazālī moved to Nishapur almost a decade later in 499/1105 at the 
request of Fakhr al-Mulk, the minister of the Sultan of Sanjar, for him to 
resume his teaching there. But in 500/1107, al-Ghazālī finally permanently 
retired and returned to Tus where he died in 505/1111.5  
Al-‘Arabī relates that he read several of al-Ghazālī’s books while he was 
studying with him but does not provide their titles. On another page he 
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mentions that he read Tahāfut al-Falāsifah, al-Qisṭas, and Mi’yār al-'Ilm, but 
does not state whether he read them alone or with al-Ghazālī. 6 We are not sure 
whether he had already read the whole of al-Ghazālī’s masterpiece Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm 
al-Dīn by the time he wrote al-‘Awāṣim. He merely states that he "heard" 
(sami’tu) about it. From such language (i.e. “heard”), it might be inferred that 
he heard it recited directly from al-Ghazālī himself or from his colleagues or 
that he was merely aware of some of its content. The latter seems more likely if 
we consider that Iḥyā’ was written just after al-Ghazālī’s first period of seclusion. 
Moreover, it is improbable that he heard al-Ghazālī recite the entire Iḥyā’ if we 
assume that he only met al-Ghazālī at Nidhamiyya College for a short time. For 
these reasons, if we assume that al-‘Arabi only met al-Ghazālī during his sojourn 
at Nidhamiyya College, as well as the fact that he seems to misunderstand al-
Ghazālī’s mystical teaching on the practice of self-mortification, we may reject 
Muḥammad al-Sulaymānī’s suggestion that al-‘Arabī studied Iḥyā’ thoroughly 
with al-Ghazālī.7 On the contrary, if we assume that al-‘Arabī had also studied 
with al-Ghazālī in Tus, it is probable that he read the whole of Iḥyā’ under the 
direction of al-Ghazālī. 
It is clear from al-‘Awāṣim that al-‘Arabī was familiar with al-Ghazālī's 
life history. However, he states that al-Ghazālī had already decided to choose 
the Sufi path and make his retreat in 486, two years earlier than the date we 
mentioned above. He also explains that this period of seclusion lasted five 
years.8 We might suppose that he retrieved this information from his direct 
interaction with al-Ghazālī, from students enrolled in Nidhamiyya College, or 
from al-Ghazālī’s autobiography al-Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl. 
Although al-‘Arabī read many of al-Ghazālī’s works, Sufism is not his 
main interest. The distance he maintains from it is evident in how he criticizes 
al-Ghazālī's adoption of certain Sufi tendencies in the works that he claims to 
have read mentioned above. Al-‘Arabī asserts that regardless of how important 
those books are for weakening the philosophers’ positions, al-Ghazālī is still at 
fault for his Sufi tendencies. He even charges that they contain “extreme” 
mystical elements.9 He explains in more detail in other parts of al-‘Awāṣim that 
there are two extreme Sufi tendencies that he disapproves of. The first is an 
extreme Sufism in which fake Hadiths are invented or statements of the 
philosophers are attributed to the Prophet.10 He blames this kind of Sufism for 
embodying the attitudes of the Batinites. Meanwhile, the second is the tendency 
among Sufis toward extreme asceticism. Al-‘Arabī argues that this is unrealistic 
because it involves self-mortification. In his opinion, a man is always a man and 
thus one cannot escape his attachment to worldly life as long as he is still alive. 
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The view held by some ascetics that a man must completely purify his heart 
from his physical attachments is impossible as long as there is still breath in his 
body.11   
The first criticism of the Sufis indeed may certainly be applied to al-
Ghazālī for his free and reckless citation of Hadiths.12   However, the second 
one does not seem to contradict with al-Ghazālī’s view of asceticism. Al-Ghazālī 
also insists that one must not ignore one’s physical body because it is one’s 
vehicle for one’s journey to God. He makes clear in Iḥyā that the denial of the 
real existence of the physical body as a constituent of the human being is not a 
Sufi teaching: “Nobody can make a journey to God if he does not have a 
physical body and does not dwell in this phenomenal world, because the 
phenomenal world is in fact the seedbed for the life to come in the Hereafter”.13 
One must not abandon this world because not all of one’s activity in it is useless 
for either the present or the future life. He further explains that human activity 
in this world can be divided into two kinds: that which is praiseworthy and that 
which is blameworthy.14 Man should abandon the latter and maintain the 
former. Clearly, then, al-‘Arabī was unaware of this important position that al-
Ghazālī held. We thus might not be wrong in our contention that al-‘Arabī  had 
not yet read all of Iḥyā’ while writing al-‘Awāṣim. Rejecting the real existence of 
a body is not , in fact, the position of  Ghazali , it was Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām 
(d.220-230/835-845), a Mu’tazilite leader, who rejected the real existence of the 
physical body as a constituent of man. This idea was sharply rejected by Abū al-
Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī (260/874-324/936) who stated in his masterpiece Mujarrad 
Maqālāt that the definition of a human being must also include his real physical 
body.15   
With respect to theology, al-‘Arabī explicitly states his strict preference 
for Ash‘arism. In this respect, he holds the opinion that God chose certain 
figures to safeguard religion and claims that the first figure he selected was al-
Ash‘arī, from whom correct theology spread from one generation of disciples to 
another.16 It is safe to assume that al-‘Arabī preferred Ash‘arism because of his 
academic activities at Nidhamiyya College. From his own account, we learn 
that the Ash‘arite theological works were used and published there and that the 
College was subsidized by government financial support amounting to ten 
thousand dinars by the minister of Muayyid Daula Abū al-Qāsim Ismā‘īl Ibn 
‘Abbād (326/938-385/995). However, al-‘Arabī laments that a fire accidentally 
broke out there and burned most of the books. Fortunately, though, he tells, he 
found the work of Abū Bakr Ibn Fūrak (330/941-406/1015).17 Although he 
does not specify which of Ibn Fūrak’s books he found there, we may suppose 
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that one of them was written not by Ibn Fūrak but rather by al-Ash‘arī. Daniel 
Gimaret explains that al-Ash‘arī’s book Mujarrad Maqālāt is his own work and 
that Ibn Fūrak was only the copier. Ibn Fūrak was the most significant figure to 
transmit al-Ash‘arī’s works by copying them out by hand. 
 
Al-‘Arabī’s Intellectual Milieu: Dialogue with Other Theological Schools 
Despite his commitment to Ash‘arism, from his own account we learn 
that al-‘Arabī was an open-minded man and happy to build intellectual dialogue 
with certain other theological schools, namely the Qadarites and the 
Mu’tazilites. He refused, however, to make dialogue with those who followed 
the Mushabbiha and Batinite schools. The main reason behind this attitude was 
that he could agree with the Qadarites and Mu’tazilites on certain points but 
not at all with either the Mushabbiha or the Batinites. He accuses these latter 
two of being ignorant and thus there being no need to discourse with them.18 
We might not be wrong to suggest that al-Ghazālī had an influence on 
al-‘Arabī’s intolerance of the Batinites. On various occasions, al-Ghazālī strongly 
criticizes this group.19 There are two main reasons why al-‘Arabī detests the 
Baṭinites. The first is because of their doctrine of the infallibility of their Imams 
and that God manifested in them. Al-Ghazālī likewise attacked them for this 
view.20 It is probable, however, that what Ibn al-‘Arabi disapproved of more was 
not the concept of the infallibility of their imams, since most Shi‘ites espouse a 
similar opinion about this issue,21 but rather the idea of the manifestation of 
God in their imams. The second is for their terrorist activities, and perhaps this 
is the most detestable thing that makes Ibn al-‘Arabī  oppose this group. Al-
‘Arabī mentions that the minister Niẓām al-Mulk, known for his support for 
Nidhamiyya College, was one of their victims. This is why, explains al-‘Arabī, 
al-Ghazālī was asked by the king to write something to counter this group. He 
then wrote two books for that purpose, namely Hujjat al-Ḥaqq fī al-Radd ‘alā 
al-Bāṭinīyah and Faḍā’iḥ al-Bāṭinīya wa Faḍāil al-Mustazhirīya.22  
It is apparent that al-‘Arabī only avoided mingling with the Baṭinites 
and not with the Shi‘ites. He tells us that he frequently participated in debates 
with them, which he found quite entertaining. He also admits that to some 
extent he could gain positive intellectual feedback from them. Finally, he 
reports that some Shi‘ite imamate figures whom he encountered had a strong 
tendency towards Mu’tazilite doctrines.23 A new tendency among Shi‘ites 
towards Mu’tazilism was introduced by al-Sheikh al-Mufīd (948-1022).24 Given 
that the latter died just fifty years before the birth of al-‘Arabī, we may suppose 
that among al-‘Arabī’s contemporaneous Shi‘ite scholars whom he encountered 
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in Baghdad were the immediate disciples of al-Sheikh al-Mufīd. It thus 
understandable that he enjoyed his debates with them. 
We learn from al-‘Arabī that he also enjoyed mingling with Hanafites. 
We would assume that he encountered them mostly around Baghdad since the 
city must have had a large number of Hanafites at that time due to the Hanafite 
college there that competed with Nidhamiyya College.25 Interestingly, he tells 
that most of the Hanafite scholars he saw in Khurasan and Iraq were 
Mu’tazilites.26 He met one important Hanafite figure, whom he calls “Qāḍī 
Ḥāmid al-Mu’tazilī al-Ḥanafī,” in Palestine. He was a Mu’tazilite and had many 
friends who belonged to various groups, such as the Shi‘ites, the Qadarites, and 
the Sunnites. They all enjoyed mingling with him because of his intellectual 
achievements. Al-‘Arabī seems to have liked him not only for his intellectual 
prowess, but also for his respectful attitude in refraining from anathematizing 
al-Ash‘arī for his opinion that man can have a vision of God.27 
Al-‘Arabī’s report that he encountered many Hanafites who embrace 
Mu’tazilite theology is certainly surprising to us because Abū Ḥanīfa himself is 
sometimes accused of being a Murji’ite. Unlike the founders of other Sunni 
schools who insist that the strength or weakness of one’s faith is determined by 
one’s actions,28 Abū Ḥanīfa holds that faith is merely the action of the heart and 
that all Muslims have the same degree of it; they differ only in their actions 
which, themselves, whether good or bad, do not affect one’s faith.29 In my 
opinion, it is only with respect to this topic that Abu Ḥanīfa’s view is closer to 
that of the Murji’ites. Whereas the Mu’tazilites insist that those who commit 
big sins are neither believers nor unbelievers and will eternally be in hellfire 
unless they repent before dying,30 the Murji’ites are much more flexible in 
maintaining that only faith is important.  
           If Abū Ḥanīfa was really a Murji’ite, then why was Mu’tazilite theology 
so interesting to the Hanafites whom al-‘Arabī met? To answer this question, let 
us discuss in a bit more detail about whether Abū Ḥanīfa really was a Murji’ite 
or not. He was labeled as one by at least two scholars. One of them was al-
Ash‘arī who contended that Abū Ḥanīfa in fact sympathized with the Murji’ites 
for their strict insistence on faith instead of religious practice.31Another was the 
Murji’ite theologian Ghassān al-Kūfī who claimed that Abū Ḥanīfa belonged to 
the Murji’ites.32 However, this latter claim seems to have no grounds since Abū 
Ḥanīfa himself denied it and considered it an insult launched by his opponents. 
He maintained that he is a Sunni (among the Ahl as-Sunna wa al-Jamā‘at).33 
Furthermore, al-Shahrastānī also argues that Ghassān’s assertion is unfounded. 
He explains that it is nearly impossible that Abū Ḥanīfa belonged to the 
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Murji’ites because, as a founder of a school of religious law, he would never 
have espoused the flexible approach to religious practice that the Murji’ites do.34 
Abu Ḥanīfa’s theology also differs from that of the Murji’ites in that the 
latter does not admit the existence of a punishment in the Hereafter while the 
former does. As to the Murji’ites’ view, Hanbalite Abū Ya‘lā ibn al-Farrā’ relates 
that most Murji’ites believe that anybody who simply declares that he believes 
in God and the Prophet Muhammad will not be punished for committing any 
sins.35 Furthermore, Hanafite theologian Muḥammad al-Nasafī explains that 
the Murji’ites assert that there is not at all any punishment in hellfire as such 
but rather that the life of those sent to hell is analogous to that of a fish in 
water. Therefore, whereas Muslim believers will enter paradise where they will 
enjoy the pleasure of eating and drinking, the non-believers will enter hell but 
will not be punished with any kind of pain there. From this account, it is 
apparent that not only do the Murji’ites deny the existence of a punishment for 
Muslim sinners but also for unbelievers. Al-Nasafī completely rejects this view 
and insists that there will be a real punishment in hell because the Quran clearly 
relates that there is.36   
             Despite the agreement between Abū Ḥanīfa and the Murji’ites that 
one’s faith is not altered when he/she commits a big sin, the Murji’ites proceed 
much farther in denying the reality of a punishment in the Hereafter. In 
contrast, Abū Ḥanīfa emphasizes the existence of a physical and mental 
punishment in the afterlife. He even accuses those who deny the existence of a 
punishment in the grave of belonging to the “disgusting Jahmite group”.37 
Thus, the position of Abū Ḥanīfa is not similar to that of the Murji’ites.38 
Furthermore, that man is responsible for the sins that he commits is not rejected 
by Abū Ḥanīfa. 39 His insistence on the importance of believing in the existence 
of a punishment in the afterlife is also close to the view of the Mu’tazilites on 
this issue. Ibn al-‘Arabī’s claim that some Hanafite scholars embrace Mu’tazilite 
doctrines is thus not totally surprising. Furthermore, another reason why they 
were attracted to the Mu’tazilites may be the rational approach that the latter 
utilize. Indeed, a rationalist tendency is known to be stronger among Hanafites 
than among adherents of other schools. It is thus understandable that from the 
Hanafites emerged another Sunnite school of theology established by Abū 
Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (853-944) who tends to be even more rational than al- 
Ash‘arī.  
Concerning Ibn al-‘Arabī’s engagement with his contemporaneous 
Mu’tazilite scholars, whom he praises for their intellectual capacities that he says 
he could benefit from, he mentions Abū Manṣūr Sātikīn, Abū Muḥammad 
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‘Abd al-‘Azīz (the chief jurist in Baskarah), Ibn al-Mannānī and others. He tells 
that the latter tried to convert him to the Mu’tazilite school. In his effort to 
convince him of its accuracy, al-Mannānī assured him that the school’s 
authority can be traced back to the Prophet Muhammad. He explained that the 
Prophet’s authority was passed down consecutively in the following order:  
‘Alī Ibn Abī Ṭālib (601-661) 
↓ 
‘Alī’s descendants 
↓ 
al-Jubbā’ī (303/915) 
↓ 
Abī Hāshim (321/933) 
↓ 
‘Abd al-Jabbār (325-415/ 937-1025) 
↓ 
Abī al-Ḥusayn (1085) 
↓ 
Ibn al-Faraj40 
  
From this chain, the importance of ‘Alī is clear from how he is the first 
to receive the Prophet’s authority. This a true reflection of the Mu’tazilites’ 
preference for ‘Alī over the other three companions among the Rightly Guided 
caliphs, a sentiment they share with Shi‘ites and Qadarites.41 As an extension of 
their preference for ‘Alī, his descendants also play a prominent role in the 
transmission of Mu’tazilite doctrines in passing them on to al-Jubbā’ī. While it 
would be very interesting if these descendants could be identified, it may also be 
nearly impossible to do so due to the great number of people who belong to 
‘Alī’s family. In any case, we cannot attend to that task in this paper. However, 
we might suggest that most of ‘Alī’s descendants became important Shi‘ite 
leaders. Many Mu’tazilites, in sharing with the Shi‘ites a predilection for ‘Alī 
and his descendants, are called moderate Mu’tazilites. They only differ from the 
Shi‘ites in refusing to venerate them in the extreme manner they do so.42 
 From the chain just described, we may note two further interesting 
points concerning the Mu’tazilites. First, since it depicts the Mu’tazilites as 
claiming religious authority from the Prophet through ‘Alī and his descendants, 
an assumption may arise that the Shi‘ites inspired the Mu’tazilites. However, 
there is a problem of finding historical proof for this assumption. Both Shi‘ites 
and Sunnis offer their own historical accounts of the early formative period of 
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Islam which both could be dubious to some extent. According to Sunni al-
Shahrastānī, interaction between ‘Alī’s descendants (the Shi‘ite figures) with the 
Mu’tazilites seemed to start with the great grandson of ‘Ali and founder of the 
Zaydites, namely Zayd ibn ‘Ali  ibn al-Ḥusayn ibn ‘Alī ibn Abī Ṭālib (d.740) 
who himself became the student of Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’(700-748).43 If we accept 
this, we might want to conclude that the Mu’tazilites inspired the Shi‘ites. 
However, to seek a fair judgment, we must also look at the comments of 
Zaydite Shi‘ites on this issue, namely those of Imām Aḥmad ibn Yaḥyā al-
Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437). He claims that Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’ learned Islamic theology 
from a son of ‘Alī named Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafiah (15-81/636-700).44 
However, this account appears to be dubious because Muḥammad ibn 
Ḥanafiah had already died by the time  was born. It is thus likely that it was 
rather Muḥammad ibn Ḥanafiah’s son, Abū Hāshim, who Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’ 
studied with. Abū Ḥāshim admitted that Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’ reached the highest 
level of knowledge in theology and suggested others to study with him.45 Since 
this account is narrated by a Zaydite leader, it is likely that Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’ held 
a special place in the heart of Zaydite Shi‘ites. Thus, al-Shahrastānī’s statement 
that the first Zaydite imam studied with Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’ seems to be true. 
Therefore, it is right to assume that there was mutual influence between the 
Shi‘ites and the Mu’tazilites, thus offering some credibility to this chain of 
transmission. In any case, the influence of Mu’tazilite doctrines on Zaydism is 
very evident.46 
            The second interesting point about this chain of transmission is that it 
shows us that in presenting it the Mu’tazilites tried to imitate the Sufi orders 
(ṭarīqa) that have also employed such chains reaching back to the Prophet to 
earn recognition. The Mu’tazilites seem to be aware that a reference to the 
Prophet is necessary for gaining credibility. In fact, most Muslim sects refer to 
the Prophet to legitimize their doctrines. The Mu’tazilites also cite a Hadith of 
the Prophet intended to back the authenticity of their beliefs. It is presented by 
Aḥmad Yaḥyā ibn al-Murtaḍā and says: “My community will be split but the 
best and most reliable are the Mu’tazilites.”47 However, this Hadith could 
certainly be fake just as it could for other Islamic sects who may invent Hadiths 
to support their views. It thus appears that the Mu’talizites not only attempted 
to convert people to their school through rational argumentation but also 
emotional indoctrination and persuasion. But despite the efforts of Ibn 
Mannānī to convert al-‘Arabī to Mu’tazilism using the latter method, he could 
not shake his allegiance to Ash‘arism. Presumably, then, al-‘Arabī was in doubt 
that this chain of transmission extending back to the Prophet was reliable.      
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Because of his direct engagement with the Mu’tazilites, it is natural that 
their focus on rational arguments also influenced al-‘Arabī. This can be seen 
from the method that he employs to support his argument for the absolute 
transcendence of God. He asserts that since God is purely transcendent, 
everything which is impossible to occur in Him must be negated. In this way 
his view accords with that of the Mu’tazilites (which was also adopted by later 
Ash‘arites) that not all Quranic verses must be understood literally. Any verses 
that describe Him with anthropomorphic features must be interpreted with the 
recognition of His absolute divine transcendence in mind.  
Considering what we have just discussed above concerning his readiness 
to mingle with non-Ash‘arites such as Mu’tazilites, Qadirites, and Shiites, it is 
obvious that al-‘Arabī is not fanatic with the Ash‘arite theological school he 
belongs to. He explicitly refers his open-minded attitude in quoting a statement 
he made during a debate with a Shi‘ite scholar: “Since you know that I belong 
to Ash‘arism, how do you accuse me of following him blindly?”48  
 
Criticism of the Zahirites and Hanbalites 
There are two Sunni groups al-‘Arabī frequently criticizes for their 
anthropomorphism, namely the Zahirites and Hanbalites. His criticism of the 
former, however, is confined to its reviver, Ibn Ḥazm (348-459/994-1064).49 
His attack on these two groups is somewhat understandable if we consider that 
al-Shahrastānī also depicts them as being close to the Mushabbiha and says they 
belong to the ahl al-ḥadīth. Al-Shahrastānī mentions two important members of 
this latter group: Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal and Dawūd ‘Alī al-Iṣfahānī. However, he 
does not accuse them of deviating from orthodoxy because they avoid espousing 
an absolute anthropomorphism adopted by other Mushabbiha groups. He even 
confirms that they are among those who will get salvation. However, whereas in 
this way al-Shahrastānī somewhat tolerates them because of their limited 
anthropomorphism,50 al-‘Arabī accuses them of being misleading.  
One indication of al-‘Arabī’s objection to the Zahirites’ 
anthropomorphism is his rejection of Ibn Ḥazm’s literal interpretation of 
Quran 39:4, which reads: “If God had wanted to take a son He could have 
chosen anyone He wished to from among His creation.” Al-‘Arabī insists that 
any literal interpretation of this verse must be avoided because it could lead to 
anthropomorphism. He thus disagrees with Ibn Ḥazm who in describing that 
God has unlimited power to create anything He wants, including a son for 
Himself or another God, makes precisely such an interpretation. In al-‘Arabī’s 
view, while certainly the absoluteness of God’s power must be accepted, it must 
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be understood in accordance with the principle of His absolute transcendence. 
Thus, Ibn Hazm’s opinion that God can make a son and another God is 
completely wrong because such an action contradicts with His transcendence 
and leads to absolute anthropomorphism. Al-‘Arabī argues that it is completely 
unimaginable that God could create something which contradicts with His 
being as the one and only God or, in other words, with the principle of unity 
(tawḥīd).51 His rejection of Ibn Ḥazm’s interpretation is perhaps also the result 
of reading al-Ghazālī's works. In Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn,52 al-Ghazālī emphasizes 
that God must not be described with any immanent features. Meanwhile, in al-
Iqtiṣād fi al-‘I'tiqād al-Ghazālī insists that  no partner shares in God’s eternity 
and that he is indivisibly one.53  
Al-‘Arabī’s depiction of Ibn Ḥazm’s anthropomorphism may be 
accurate if he is judging from the perspective of the later Ash‘arite position he 
espouses. As a Zahirite, Ibn Ḥazm disapproves of metaphorical interpretations 
of ambiguous portions of religious texts that the later Ash‘arites made. 
According to al-Shahrastānī, this attitude is why the Zahirites were classified 
among anthropomorphic groups. It is also why they are somewhat similar to the 
literalists (ahl al-ḥadīth), namely the Hanbalites and some Malikites.  
In reality, Ibn Ḥazm’s theological approach is totally unique. It can 
neither be compared to that of the rationalists nor that of the literalists. Its 
uniqueness lies in his insistence on four points that must be accepted 
concerning the power of God. First, it is eternal. Second, God can do 
something impossible. Third, He can do something that He never does. And 
fourth, His power is unlimited.54  
In his famous theological work al-Faṣl fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwā’ wa al-
Niḥal, Ibn Ḥazm argues that because God is absolutely powerful, He has no 
limits.55 For this reason, he rejects the view of the Mu’tazilites that God cannot 
be said to do things that He does not do. Such a view, he says, denies the 
absolute power of God. Therefore, God can do anything He wants, even unjust, 
a liar or have a son.56 Al-‘Arabī, then, seems to be familiar with this unique view 
of Ibn Ḥazm from al-Faṣl fī al-Milal wa al-Ahwā’ wa al-Niḥal.57 
Concerning al-‘Arabī’s reaction to the anthropomorphic tendency of the 
Hanbalites, he rejects the literal interpretation of Abū Ya’lā ibn al-Farrā’ (380-
458/ 990-1066) of a famous Hadith that tells that Adam was created in 
accordance with God’s form. He declares that al-Farrā’s interpretation asserting 
that Adam was truly created in the same form as God, excepting Adam’s beard 
and genitals, is completely misleading. In al-‘Arabī’s opinion, this ambiguous 
Hadith must be interpreted as saying that Adam was created in the form of a 
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human being and not in the form of God because God is completely 
transcendent and formless.58 Clearly, al-‘Arabī’s account of al-Farrā’s 
anthropomorphic interpretation allows us to categorize it as identical to that of 
the Mujassimah group.59 However, the views expressed by al-Farrā’ himself do 
not seem to support al-‘Arabī’s understanding of his position. He is consistent 
with the Hanbalite theological approach which rejects neither literal nor 
metaphorical interpretations of figurative religious texts. In Kitāb al-Mu‘tamad 
fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, he vehemently attacks the Mujassimah for their 
anthropomorphism. He even does not hesitate to accuse one who believes that 
God has a body with limbs just like those of human beings or other contingent 
beings of being an infidel.60 In terms of  Quranic verses mentioning God’s face, 
although he does believe that God really has a face and considers it to be a 
divine attribute super-added onto His essence, he insists that it is beyond 
figurative explanation. He even clearly refutes the opinion of the Mujassimah 
that God’s face is identical to that of a human.61 Therefore, al-‘Arabī’s 
accusation that al-Farrā’ believes that Adam’s form is similar to God’s seems 
incorrect. In fact, there are perhaps two reasons why he makes such a claim. The 
first is that it may be the result of an overreaction on the part of the Ash‘arites 
towards al-Farrā’s criticism of the Ash‘arites’ metaphorical approach to 
interpretation.62 The second is that it is perhaps because of a theological 
inconsistency al-Farrā’ displays in his writings. However, to prove this latter 
possibility, we face the difficulty of ascertaining the chronological order in 
which his works were composed.  
We might ask here whether al-‘Arabī generalizes in asserting that all 
Hanbalites make rigid anthropomorphic interpretations of certain Quranic 
verses. This question is not easy to answer because what the majority of 
Hanbalites espouse is in fact closer to what the earlier Ash‘arites did who 
considered that ambiguous portions of religious texts which contain or suggest 
anthropomorphic elements must be understood neither literally nor 
metaphorically; rather, they stand beyond explanation.63 Al-‘Arabī seems to be 
aware of this. For example, when he discusses Quran 5:64, 39:67, and 38:75, 
which state that God has a hand, he admits that the earlier Ash‘arites believed 
that a hand is one of the divine attributes of God. Of course, they made it clear 
that they were not supposing that His hand could be compared to anything in 
the temporal world but rather that it must be said to be beyond description 
(bilā kayfa). Al-‘Arabī then explains that this interpretation was abandoned by 
the later Ash‘arites who chose to understand seeming anthropomorphic verses 
metaphorically. The "hand" of God thus came to be understood by them as a 
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metaphor for God's power,64 an interpretation which is almost similar to that of 
the Mu’tazilites.65 Al-Ash‘arī himself clearly did not adopt such an approach. In 
Maqālāt al-Islāmīyīn wa Ikhtilāf al-Muṣallīn, he states that the Sunnis and the 
literalists share the view that although God neither has a body nor resembles 
anything, all descriptions of God in the Quran and Hadiths that depict him as 
having hands or a face, or that he is light or sits on a throne, must be 
understood as they are set forth, but neither in a literal nor metaphorical sense.66 
As such, we may assume that al-‘Arabī might have been aware that the position 
on anthropomorphism in scripture of the earlier Ash‘arites that had already 
been abandoned by the later ones is similar to that of the Hanbalites. Therefore, 
we can conclude that he does not generalize and assert that all Hanbalites 
espouse unconditional anthropomorphic interpretations of scripture as the 
Mujassimah do. 
Another Hanbalite view that al-‘Arabī sharply criticizes is that of the 
nature of the Quran. Theologians of different schools have had different 
opinions on the matter. The debate surrounding it has continued on into our 
times and has always seemed to polarize the Ash‘arites and Hanbalites. 
However, the two groups are in agreement over one aspect of the topic. They 
both hold that the Quran and other Abrahamic scriptures were not created by 
God but rather exist eternally in Him as His attributes. With this contention 
they differ completely from the Mu’tazilites who believe that the Quran was 
created by God. Otherwise, however, the Hanbalites and Ash‘arites disagree on 
other aspects concerning the nature of the Quran. The Hanbalites are known 
for their literal understanding that the Quran is the real Word of God which is 
made up of Arabic letters and sounds. This position has been criticized by both 
Mu’tazilites and Ash‘arites. For his part, al-‘Arabī criticizes it by insisting that 
the Quran contains neither letters nor sounds but rather a meaning which exists 
in the essence of God.67 This view is clearly in line with that of al-Ash‘arī. The 
latter states in Mujarrad Maqālāt that the Word of God is not contained in 
letters and sounds because it is one of the divine attributes of God co-eternal 
with His essence.68 
For al-Ash‘arī, it is better to describe the Quran as the divine speech of 
God which only occurs in His mind, thus being completely transcendent and 
free from any temporal elements. The Quran as the Word of God is then not 
created and only exists within Him (Kalām Nafsī). It has no connection with 
the phenomenal world nor any contingent being. Sounds and letters being 
temporal,69 His divine speech does not contain them and so is beyond all 
languages. Therefore, when God’s speech manifests in certain languages such as 
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Arabic in the case of the Quran or Hebrew in the case of the Torah, this does 
not mean that God speaks in such languages but rather that He creates the 
expression of His speech in them. His speech itself cannot be expressed in these 
languages because it is His eternal attribute. Thus, such expression is the 
creation of God; it does not constitute His eternal divine attribute of speech but 
rather exists among contingent beings.70 In the same way, when the Quran, for 
instance, is regarded as the Prophet Muhammad’s miracle, it is not because it is 
the speech of God per se but rather because of the recitation of the Quran that 
the Prophet Muhammad acquired without learning from anybody.71 
This view allows al-Ash‘arī to further assert that God’s speech never 
ceases, becomes mute or silent, and has no defect. Only God Himself can hear 
it through his eternal attribute of hearing. While for al-Māturīdī God’s speech 
(kalām nafsī) cannot be heard by any contingent beings, al-Ash‘arī maintains 
that in its originality (i.e. its ultimate transcendence) it can if God allows it to 
be.72 Of course, such a possibility is not open to just anyone, but rather only to 
whom God chooses to have that experience. Al-Ash‘arī mentions Moses and 
Muhammad as among those chosen. Moses heard God’s speech without 
mediation, neither through recitation nor any kind of expression. God allowed 
him to hear His speech in its original form as His attribute of speaking. 
Similarly, during his ascension to heaven (mi’rāj), the Prophet Muhammad 
listened directly to God’s speech without any mediation. He even insists that 
because God chose to endow Muhammad with the greatest capacities which 
surpass those of all other prophets, he could not only hear and speak with God 
directly then but also see Him directly. This view differs from that of the 
Mu’tazilites who reject the possibility of such capabilities. They claim that if 
Moses could not speak with and see God directly, then all other Prophets would 
also never be able to do so, both in this present life and in the Hereafter. The 
impossibility of these actions is due to their contention that God is bodiless and 
formless.73  
Ordinary people indeed can hear the Quran, al-Ash‘arī insists, but what 
they hear is not the Quran as the speech of God existing in Him as kalām nafsī 
but rather the Quran expressed in Arabic containing letters and sounds 
belonging to the temporal world, all being the creation of God. The difference 
between how God hears His speech and how ordinary believers do is that while 
the former hears it through His absolute eternal attribute of hearing, the latter 
hear it by means of their faculty of hearing created by God.74 Therefore, the 
written or recited Quran is not the real Quran that is the divine attribute of 
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God but rather the creation of God that is created at the moment when it is 
written or recited.  
The debate among Muslim theologians surrounding this topic is 
extremely heated. Both the Hanbalites and Ash‘arites attack and accuse each 
other of deviating from orthodoxy. While the former accuse the latter of 
imitating Ibn al-Kulab (d. 242/855),75 the Ash‘arites, as represented here by al-
‘Arabī, charge the Hanbalites with following the Qadarites’ view of the nature 
of the Quran. Al-‘Arabī seems to see that the Hanbalites and Qadarites agree 
that the Quran is made up of letters and sounds. However, the differences 
between their standpoints on the matter are very considerable. While the 
Qadarites affirm that the letters and sounds of the Quran were created by God, 
the Hanbalites view them as His eternal attribute. Similarly, while for the 
Hanbalites God spoke with Moses through His eternal speech consisting of 
letters and sounds, for the Qadarite God spoke with him by creating His divine 
speech in a tree which upon regarding it Moses could understand what He was 
saying. The Qadarites cite this event to prove that God's speech is not one of 
his attributes but rather is His creation.  
Al-‘Arabī suggests that in their belief that the written and recited Quran 
is the real Quran, the Hanbalites may have been influenced by the Qadarites. 
However, he does not classify them in the same category as the latter whom he 
explicitly declares as infidels for their conviction that the Quran is entirely 
created. This could be for two reasons. First, the Hanbalites never assert that the 
Quran is created whereas the Qadarites do. Second, there appears to have 
existed a certain level of mutual respect between the Hanbalites and Ash‘arites 
that restrained them from anathematizing one another. An instance of this 
attitude is al-Shahrastānī’s attitude in tolerating the anthropomorphism of the 
Hanbalites and the Zahirites.76 What they frequently use as a reference point in 
judging one another is religious orthodoxy. It is not a surprise, then, that Al-
‘Arabī also avoids designating the Hanbalites as infidels. He even does not 
employ the term bid‘ah used to refer to a deviation from orthodoxy. He merely 
accuses them of being irrational: “I think that those who affirm that the Quran 
is created are infidels. But those who affirm that the real Quran contains letters 
and sounds and believe that these letters and sounds are eternal are irrational.”77  
Al-‘Arabī is thus clearly more tolerant towards the Hanbalite figurative 
understanding of the nature of the Quran than the Qadarites’ belief in its 
createdness, for which he believed they deserved to be called infidels. This 
attitude is less sympathetic than that of al-Ghazālī who was more careful to 
avoid accusing any groups who disagree with his positions of disbelief. In al-
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Munqidh min al-Ḍalāl, al-Ghazālī contends that the espousal of only three 
views can merit someone the charge of infidelity: 1) rejecting bodily 
resurrection in the Hereafter; 2) declaring that God only knows universals, not 
particulars; and 3) believing in the eternity of the world, with respect to both its 
past and future.78 Certainly by this criteria there are some Muslims that would 
be considered unbelievers, especially Muslim philosophers. In Fayṣal al-Tafriqa 
Bayna al-Islām wa al-Zandaqa, however, al-Ghazālī insists that one can only be 
deemed an infidel by rejecting three articles of faith, namely the oneness of 
God, Muhammad’s prophethood, and the Last Day.79 By this measure, not a 
single Muslim could be considered an infidel regardless of his or her affiliation 
with one of various Muslim groups. We must therefore agree with Sherman 
Jackson’s conclusion that al-Ghazālī is in fact an ecumenical Muslim scholar.80  
By deeming the Qadarites unbelievers for their belief in the createdness 
of the Quran, al-‘Arabī clearly does not embrace al-Ghazālī‘s criteria for 
determining who is an infidel but rather that of Imām Mālik ibn Anas who 
proposes a harsh punishment for the Qadarites.81 The influence of Imām Mālik 
ibn Anas and his legal school in Spain was huge82 and thus it is understandable 
if al-‘Arabī was influenced by him. However, since al-‘Arabī still seeks to 
maintain relative harmony with the Hanbalites, his attitude must be a reflection 
of the mutual respect that has existed between these two Sunni groups for 
centuries. It is also possible that his attitude is one common to alumni of 
Nidhamiyya College.  
          
Understanding Ambiguous Hadiths Metaphorically  
As mentioned earlier, al-‘Arabī believes that a metaphorical 
interpretation of ambiguous religious texts is necessary. Without it, one may fall 
into making claims for anthropomorphism. He certainly supports the move of 
later Ash‘arites to replace the somewhat anthropomorphic views of the early 
Ash‘arites with a new approach that might be described as pure non-
anthropomorphic interpretation. We have already discussed how he 
metaphorically interprets God’s hand referred to in some Quranic verses as His 
power. Now, let us consider his metaphorical interpretations of the religious 
texts secondary to the Quran, namely Hadiths. In trying to understand 
ambiguous Hadiths that seem to contradict the principle of God’s absolute 
transcendence, al-‘Arabī again decided to follow the example of the later 
Ash‘arites. For him, in order to preserve this principle, any seemingly 
anthropomorphic descriptions of God must be interpreted according to it. 
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As we pointed out above, al-‘Arabī is critical about the authenticity of 
Hadiths. Clearly, he must have some knowledge about how to determine their 
reliability, as indicated by his habit of explaining the degree of a Hadith’s 
authenticity and reliability before introducing it. His most frequent reference 
when citing Hadiths is to Bukhārī and Muslim.83 His disapproval of the Sufis’ 
recklessness in selecting Hadiths is proof that he does not tolerate the efforts of 
any group to invent a Hadith. He expressly selects certain Hadiths he considers 
reliable and criticizes others he does not believe are authentic or which sound 
illogical. He thus judges Hadiths not only by the level of their reliability and 
authenticity but also by their content. If a Hadith’s content does not make 
sense, he attempts to deal with it in two ways. First, he tries to interpret it 
according to religious principles, considering whether it is consistent with them. 
Second, he employs a rational approach. He insists that the use of reason is 
absolutely necessary and that reason and religion cannot be separated. Reason’s 
role is to purify religion from any absurd understandings that might be arrived 
at.84 Therefore, if the content of a Hadith contradicts reason, especially 
regarding the attributes of God, a metaphorical approach to interpreting it must 
be adopted.   
Let us begin examining al-‘Arabī’s metaphorical interpretation of 
Hadiths by looking at one in which the Prophet counts the heavens up until the 
seventh one. He also designates the location of the Throne above these heavens 
and God above the Throne. According to al-‘Arabī, the Prophet’s description of 
God stationed on the Throne must be understood metaphorically to imply that 
God is great and almighty. He criticizes the literalist interpretation of Abū 
Muḥammad ‘Abd Allāh ibn Abī Zayd (d. 389/ 998) who believed that God 
with his divine essence is truly situated above the Throne. He explains that this 
understanding is incorrect because it posits God existing in space and time 
which completely contradicts His absolute transcendence. He insists that this 
latter principle concerning God’s nature be honored and thus that nothing 
belonging to the temporal world may be attributed to His being. He claims that 
God never describes Himself in terms contradicting the boundaries of religion 
and reason. He says: “We know with certainty that God has existed for all 
eternity before He created all worlds. He is forever different from what He 
creates. Neither His divine attributes nor His essence have changed, neither 
before nor after His act of creation."85 It is not clear, however, why he does not 
think this Hadith is sound (ṣahīh). Perhaps it is because of what he might 
consider to be its irrational message. 
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Another Hadith al-‘Arabī uses a metaphorical approach to interpret 
states: “Our God descends to the earth’s atmosphere every night." Again, for al-
‘Arabī it is impossible to understand this Hadith literally because it contradicts 
God’s absolute transcendence. He notes that the verb "descend" used in this 
Hadith has two meanings. First, it may denote a physical movement. Second, it 
may refer to the God’s grace and blessings. He believes that only the latter sense 
of the word is appropriate in the context of this Hadith.86 If it were the first, 
that would be completely misleading, for God, being beyond space and time, 
cannot make any physical movement. This interpretation certainly differs from 
that of al-Ash‘arī who suggested that this Hadith be understood as asserting that 
God really descends to this world, but that His descent cannot be compared to 
that of anything belonging to the temporal world.87 
For al-‘Arabī, the many Hadiths explicitly describing God with human 
behavior or attributes must also be understood metaphorically. He tells that 
when debating with the anthropomorphic groups, he found their arguments 
absurd and inconsistent. He presented at least two famous ambiguous Hadiths 
to them to challenge them. In one of them, God is depicted as laughing and 
happy. Whereas the anthropomorphic groups interpret it literally, al-‘Arabī 
argues that although it is reliable, its content is ambiguous if considered by the 
principle of God’s transcendence. Neither laughter nor happiness can be 
deemed attributes of God. Thus, these two terms must be understood in this 
context as referring to His divine grace and gifts. To test the consistency of the 
anthropomorphists’ with their literalist approach, al-‘Arabī presents a second 
Hadith describing God as hungry, thirsty, sick, and naked. When asked 
whether they also believe that God has such attributes, they replied that this 
Hadith cannot be interpreted literally because that would lead to the wrong 
understanding that God has such defects as hunger, thirst, sickness, and 
nakedness.88 For al-‘Arabī, however, no anthropomorphic descriptions 
mentioned in Hadiths, whether of positive or negative qualities, can be 
understood literally. Moreover, similar ambiguous assertions concerning God 
mentioned in Hadiths must not be understood literally, such as that "the earth 
belongs to God”, “Paradise is the house of God”, or the “Ka'ba is the house of 
God”. These expressions cannot be describing God literally because He does 
not need a place; He is completely beyond space and time.     
Al-‘Arabī thus tries to demonstrate that these anthropomorphic groups 
are not really consistent in their rejection of metaphorical interpretation of 
religious texts. They seem to have a double standard in interpreting the 
ambiguous Hadiths. They understand literally statements found in Hadiths 
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describing God with positive human features, such as the feeling of happiness 
and the ability to walk and descend down to the world, and designate them as 
His real attributes. However, when they portray God with a defective human or 
corporeal quality, such as sickness, hunger, or nakedness, they refrain from 
deeming them His attributes. Al-‘Arabī therefore explains that the best 
argument that may be employed to counter their anthropomorphic views asserts 
that all qualities God is depicted as having in the two Hadiths discussed above 
cannot in fact be attributed to Him because they imply physical movement on 
His part.89  
 
Conclusion 
As a defender of Ash‘arite theology, Abū Bakr ibn al-‘Arabī  is certainly 
still in agreement with Ḥasan al-Ash‘arī in his view on the nature of the Quran. 
However, in terms of interpreting ambiguous religious texts, he adopts the 
metaphorical approach of later Ash‘arism. His harsh critique of the literal 
interpretation of such texts is not only addressed to the Hanbalites, but also to 
the Zahirites and the earlier Ash‘arites who followed the Hanbalites’ literalist 
method. In any case, he appears to be an independent scholar who never 
hesitates to express his own ideas, even if that means challenging the views of his 
own master.   
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